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THE RISE OF RIGHTS-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION 
AND GERMANY’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUIT 
Marc Zemel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent trends in climate activism point to more litigation. Plaintiffs 
are bringing claims against corporations,1 regulatory agencies,2 and 
governments as a whole3 to force an energy transition that they see as 
too slow and insufficient. In particular, recent rulings in several 
jurisdictions around the world have breathed life into rights-based 
constitutional claims against national governments for failing to 
protect their citizens through climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Even state actors with relatively “good” climate policies, 
such as Switzerland, have not escaped suit.4 As courts give credence 
                                                                 
* Marc Zemel is an attorney with the Seattle, WA law firm Smith & Lowney PLLC 
and wrote this article as a Robert Bosch Stiftung fellow in Berlin. The author would 
like to thank Professor Dr. Michael Kloepfer of the Humboldt Unversität Law 
Faculty and the staff at Forschungszentrum Umweltrecht for generously hosting him 
while working on this article. 
1.See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, No. 17-CV-2301 (VEC), 2018 WL 
1605572 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (transferred from N.D. Tex. March 29, 2017); 
Santa Cruz v. Chevron, Case No. 17CV03243 (Santa Cruz County Superior Court, 
filed December 20, 2017); Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court 
of Hamm (Nov. 30, 2017), translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/
download/20812.pdf; Attracta Mooney & Ed Crooks, New York Sues Big Oil 
Companies Over Climate Change, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/4de8e4fc-f62b-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00 
[http://perma.cc/BMX2-3ZHP]. 
 2. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007). 
 3. See id. at 506-7. 
 4. See Jan Burck, Franziska Marten & Christoph Bals, Climate Change 
Performance Index: Results 2017, GERMAN WATCH AND CLIMATE ACTION 
NETWORK, 12 (2017), https://germanwatch.org/en/download/16484.pdf (indicating 
Switzerland is the 14th best performer on climate change, but concluding that “No 
country is doing enough to prevent dangerous climate change.”); Verein 
KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Swiss 
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to these novel legal theories – which range from alleged violations of 
fiduciary duties to violations of the fundamental rights to life and 
property –the frequency of rights-based climate lawsuits will likely 
increase. 
Among industrialized nations, Germany is an excellent example 
where no one has yet brought a climate-related constitutional claim 
against the government, but where a suit seems inevitable. Germany is 
missing its 2020 emissions reduction target so badly that the new 
governing coalition that emerged from the 2017 federal election 
debated abandoning the target altogether.5 Indeed, despite positioning 
itself as a leader on climate change, Germany is a favorable target for 
a rights-based suit due to (1) it backsliding on emissions reduction 
promises, (2) its liberal access to justice policies for constitutional 
claims,6 (3) its affirmative constitutional duty to protect fundamental 
rights, and (4) an enumerated constitutional state goal to “protect the 
natural foundations of life” with a “responsibility toward future 
generations.”7 
                                                                 
Federal Administrative Court, Nov. 25, 2016), translated in 
http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/request_
KlimaSeniorinnen.pdf. 
 5. For a critique of the latest climate-change related news related to the Grand 
Coalition agreement, see Niklas Höhne, Germany’s New Government Deal Fails the 
Paris Climate Accord Test, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Mar. 12, 2018), 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/03/12/germanys-new-government-deal-
fails-paris-climate-accord-test/. See also, Guy Chazan & Tobias Buck, Carbon 
Targets on the Table in German Coalition Talks, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d2572cec-f470-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00. 
Germany had set a goal of reducing its GHG by 40 percent below the 1990 level by 
2020. Germany’s target is a component of the European Union (EU) Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, which pledged to 
reduce the Union’s emissions by 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. See Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States, LATVIAN 
PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/European%20 Union%20
First/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf. 
 6. See Grundgesetz [GG][Basic Law] art. 93(1)(4a) translated in 
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtgeset [BverfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], at 
§90(1) (Ger.). 
 7. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 20(a) translated in https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. 
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This article proceeds in three parts. First, this article addresses the 
rise of rights-based climate litigation as a tool to force governments to 
more aggressively respond to climate change. Next, it traces some of 
the most recent developments in rights-based climate litigation in 
national courts within the European Union, with particular focus on 
Urgenda v. The Netherlands and Friends of the Irish Environment v. 
Ireland, et al. Finally, this Article explores the availability and 
evaluates the susceptibility of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
similar rights-based climate-related claims under the German 
Grundgesetz (G.G.).8 Germany is widely viewed as a leader on climate 
change mitigation. However, Germany is not following through with 
its commitments and it remains a significant GHG emitter, as 
exemplified by its continued reliance on coal and other fossil fuels. 
The strong activist psyche of its citizens suggests that a rights-based 
climate suit is highly likely in the Federal Constitutional Court. To be 
sure, such a suit faces significant hurdles and success is far from 
certain. However, there are several constitutional claims to be made. 
I. THE RISE OF RIGHTS-BASED CLIMATE LITIGATION 
There is scientific and diplomatic consensus about the threats that 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pose and the levels of reduction 
needed to avert the worst effects of anthropogenic climate change.9 In 
an unprecedented expression of global unity, every nation on the 
planet10 (at least until the United States withdraws from the Paris 
Accord in 2020)11 has agreed to the principles stated in the Paris 
Accord, including, “[h]olding the increase in the global average 
                                                                 
 8. “Basic Law,” “Grundgesetz,” and “Constitution” are used interchangeably in 
this article. 
 9. See, e.g., Rajendra K. Pachauri et. al., Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report 
(2014), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 2 (2014), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. 
 10. Syria, the last holdout, joined the Paris Accord in November 2017. Lisa 
Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-
paris-agreement.html [http://perma.cc/5F7K-V8EJ]. 
 11. Although the United States has already expressed its intention to withdraw 
from Paris, under the terms of the agreement, it is unable to do so until 2020. See 
Paris Agreement, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 28, Dec. 12, 
2016, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Apr. 22, 2016. 
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temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels. . . .”12 Yet, GHG emissions continue to rise,13 and the 
gaps between state action and the Paris Accord’s goal highlight the 
inadequacy of traditional political processes to address this challenge. 
The combination of dire forecasts for the planet’s climate and the 
diminishing pathways for mitigation motivate aggrieved parties to 
bring rights-based claims. In 2017 during the 23rd conference of 
parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bonn, Germany (COP 23),14 the UN 
published troubling conclusions about current emission trends: 
countries are falling short of their national emission reduction targets, 
and even if all the parties met their reduction pledges, it would still not 
be enough to meet the Paris Accord’s objective.15 
Critics of the plodding pace of tangible governmental responses are 
concluding that political branches of government are simply not up to 
the task to implement policies that are sufficiently aggressive to avert 
the worst effects of climate change.16 This faithlessness in political 
leaders breeds various forms of protest and direct actions. For 
example, on the eve of COP 23, several thousand demonstrators 
occupied one of the largest open pit coal mine in Europe, just 50 km 
away from the COP 23 venue in Germany.17 At the end of the 
                                                                 
 12. Paris Agreement, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 
2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2016, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Apr. 22, 2016 
[hereinafter, Paris Agreement]. 
 13. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, CO2 Emissions Were Flat for Three Years. 
Now They’re Rising Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/13/climate/co2-emissions-rising-again.html (citing three 
scientific journals) [http://perma.cc/2XB3-P46X]. 
 14. Although it took place in Bonn, Germany, COP23 was hosted by Fiji. 
 15. The Emissions Gap Report 2017, A UN Environment Synthesis Report, U.N. 
ENV’T PROGRAMME (Nov. 2017), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/
20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf. 
 16. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 233, 225 (2016) (“There is no realistic prospect that sustainable 
global controls on greenhouse gas emissions will be adopted in the next decade. 
Instead, the global community is on track to surpass the one teraton available in the 
next fifteen to twenty years.”). 
 17. Jonathan Watts, Germany’s Dirty Coalmines Become the Focus for a New 
Wave of Direct Action, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/08/germanys-dirty-
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conference activists also occupied and disrupted a nearby coal-fired 
power plant.18 Participants in these actions hoped to influence policy-
makers and focus the world’s attention on the fact that Germany, 
despite its reputation as a leader on addressing climate change, is still 
reliant on lignite coal, one of the dirtiest fuels.19 
Speaking at COP 23, California Governor Jerry Brown20 
acknowledged that the unique urgency of climate change will require 
unconventional responses. Although Governor Brown did not address 
civil disobedience as a possible response,21 he did compare the threat 
of climate challenge to the Second World War, suggesting Congress 
was ill equipped to do what was necessary for the United States to take 
sufficient action: 
                                                                 
coalmines-become-the-focus-for-a-new-wave-of-direct-action 
[http://perma.cc/AMS2-KEEC]. Other examples of direct action include the 
encampments resisting the Dakota Access Pipeline and shutting down active oil 
pipelines in the United States, among others. See Nia Williams, Activists Disrupt Key 
Canada-U.S. Oil Pipelines, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016) https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-canada-pipelines/activists-disrupt-key-canada-u-s-oil-pipelines-
idUSKCN12B26O [http://perma.cc/4S6S-6YEL]; Hilary Beaumont, Pipeline 
Protests Will Likely Heat up in 2018, VICE NEWS (Dec. 27, 2017) 
https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/kznzzx/pipelines-protests-will-likely-heat-up-
in-2018 [http://perma.cc/HNQ7-K4DN]. 
 18. The Associated Press, The Latest: Activists Disrupt German Coal Power 
Plant, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.de/ap-the-latest-
activists-disrupt-german-coal-power-plant-2017-11?r=UK&IR=T [http://perma.cc/
L5WA-TEC8]. 
 19. Ende Gelände 2017, Ende Gelände in the Hambach Opencast Mine (Nov. 24, 
2017), https://www.ende-gelaende.org/en/news/ende-gelande-in-the-hambach-
opencast-mine/ [http://perma.cc/QF3P-FN9C]; see also B.D. Hong and E.R. Slatick, 
Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-
0121(49/Q1) 1-8 (Aug. 1994), https://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/
co2_article/co2.html. 
 20. Governor Brown headlined the “We Are Still In” faction in Bonn from the 
United States, which consisted mostly of Democratic politicians seeking to stay 
engaged on the international level as a positive force despite the Trump 
Administration’s hostility to Paris. See WE ARE STILL IN, COP23: We Showed the 
World that America is Still In, https://www.wearestillin.com/cop23. 
 21. In fact, Governor Brown has shown some hostility toward disruptive 
protesters. See Amy Goodman, CA Gov. Jerry Brown Tells Indigenous Activists 
Protesting Fracking He’ll Put Them ‘In the Ground,’ DEMOCRACY NOW, (Nov. 13, 
2017) https://www.democracynow.org/2017/11/13/ca_gov_jerry_brown_tells_
indigenous [http://perma.cc/K3ZH-Z8EV]. 
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Maybe it was December [‘]41, or maybe it was ‘42; 
President Roosevelt said no more private passenger cars. 
Over. Now we’re going to make tanks, and we’re going to 
make liberty ships and we’re going to make fighter planes. 
That was it. Well someday someone is going to have to say 
no more fossil fuel cars. Period. We gotta [sic] have clean 
cars. But the way we work, we’re not at war, we’re just in a 
catastrophic existential threat that will destroy everything, 
but we don’t get that yet. . . .22 
Critics say policymakers will not “get” the magnitude of the problem 
we face until the globe starts experiencing serious, tangible effects 
from the changing climate.23 However, by that point substantial effects 
could be too late to avoid.24 
Professor Karl Coplan clarified this sentiment in discussing the 
“cultural cognition challenges for a law-based response to climate 
change.”25 Coplan explained that natural cognitive biases pose 
substantial barriers to political consensus and strong corresponding 
barriers to a legislative response to climate change due to its delayed 
effects.26 Legislatures adequately respond to crises that are already 
under way,27 but that will not help with the climate crisis. As Coplan 
notes, 
                                                                 
 22. Transcribed from audio recorded by the author. 
 23. See e.g. Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2016); U.N. Environment Programme, The Emissions 
Gap Report 2017, A UN Environment Synthesis Report (Nov. 2017), 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf. 
 24. Coplan, supra note 23. 
 25. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244-46. 
 26. Coplan, supra note 23 (stating “These cognitive biases include: avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance, availability heuristic, loss aversion, status quo preferences, 
optimism, confirmation bias, inability to process low-probability events, and 
framing.”) (citing Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 553 (2012)); see also GEORGE 
MARSHALL, DON’T EVEN THINK ABOUT IT: WHY OUR BRAINS ARE WIRED TO 
IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (Bloomsbury 2014). 
 27. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244 (citing post-Depression regulations, civil rights 
legislation, and environmental regulation after disasters). 
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[t]his reactive nature of legislative initiative, unfortunately, 
suggests that any major legislative response will be deferred 
until the effects of climate change reach visible, 
unambiguous, crisis proportions. . . . It is hard to say when 
such a series of weather catastrophes sufficiently certain to 
be climate change-related will occur, but by definition they 
will not occur until catastrophic climate change is already 
upon us. In such case, it will already be too late. . . .28 
Copland concluded that at some point, when the effects of climate 
change are too pronounced to ignore, a total ban on fossil fuels will be 
the only available response.29 
How to overcome these cognitive biases and induce the political 
branches of government to timely mitigate climate change is a key 
question. Activists are increasingly turning to rights-based litigation 
and engaging the judicial branch for an answer. Concerned citizens 
unsatisfied with overtures to their elected representatives or 
accountability at the ballot box – but who are unprepared to engage in 
civil disobedience – see the courts as an opportunity to enhance their 
involvement with this struggle. 
An Irish court handed down one of the most recent constitutional 
rulings of this type, significantly bolstering the credibility of these 
rights-based claims. The court found “a personal constitutional right to 
an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well-
being of citizens at large.”30 This ruling followed the extraordinary 
                                                                 
 28. Coplan, supra note 23, at 244-245 (citing ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 465, 524, 679 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2010); 
Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] 
IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21 2017); see also Karen Savage, Climate Lawsuit Aims to 
Enforce Ireland’s Emissions Targets, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2017/11/07/climate-lawsuit-ireland-
emissions-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/4USK-NPLK]. Earlier the same month 
New Zealand also weighed in, concluding that developments in a variety of 
jurisdictions indicate “it may be appropriate for domestic courts to play a role in 
Government decision making about climate change policy.” Case No. CIV 2015-
485-919 [2017] NZHC 733, In re decisions made under the Climate Change 
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decisions of Urgenda Foundation v. The Netherlands,31 Juliana v. 
United States,32 and Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan33 in the 
Netherlands, the U.S. and Pakistan, respectively. Notably, the 
Urgenda court concluded that “the State has a duty of care to take 
[climate change] mitigation measures,”34 and ordered the Dutch 
government to “limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas 
emissions, or have them limited . . .” to specified volumes.35 The rise 
of rights-based climate litigation is an undeniable trend that is likely to 
spread.36 
II. CLIMATE LITIGATION IN EUROPE 
Climate change related litigation has reached such a frequency that 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a report in 
2017 reviewing its reach.37 An online database of climate change 
litigation is updated monthly by Columbia Law School and the law 
firm Arnold & Porter.38 Citing this database, the UNEP Report states 
that “[a]s of March 2017 climate change cases had been filed in 24 
countries (25 if one counts the European Union), with 654 cases filed 
in the U.S. and over 230 cases filed in all other countries combined.”39 
As of May 1, 2018, this figure had increased to 860 cases in the U.S. 
and 264 cases in other countries.40 The UNEP report considers 
                                                                 
Response Act 2002 and public decisions made in relation to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Judgment ¶ 133 (Nov. 2, 2017). 
 31. Zaaknummer Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf. 
 32. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1,224 (D. Or. 2016). 
 33. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, Case No. WP No 25501/2015 (Lahore 
High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf. 
 34. Urgenda at ¶ 4.83. 
 35. Id. at ¶ 5.1. 
 36. See U.N. Environment Programme, The Status of Climate Change Litigation: 
A Global Review (May 2017), http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/20767. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, http://climatecasechart.com/about/. 
 39. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 10. 
 40. SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, http://climatecasechart.com/
about/; see also U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 10 (totals go 
beyond rights-based constitutional claims, and include all cases “brought before 
administrative, judicial and other investigatory bodies that raise issues of law or fact 
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litigation an “important tool to push policymakers and market 
participants to develop and implement effective means of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. . . .”41 
Regarding potential constitutional claims, the UNEP report 
indicates that as of 2012 “there [were] at least 92 countries that [had] 
granted constitutional status to [the right to a clean or healthy 
environment], and a total of 177 countries recognize[d] the right” in 
general.42 The report counts Germany among these countries.43 In 
2012, “[t]he only remaining holdouts [were] the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Oman, Afghanistan, 
Kuwait, Brunei Darussalam, Lebanon, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea, 
Malaysia, and Cambodia.”44 Since 2012, a Federal District Court in 
the United States declared there is “no doubt that the right to a climate 
system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and 
ordered society.”45 The bottom line is that “[t]oday [a human right to 
a healthy environment] is widely recognized in international law and 
endorsed by an overwhelming proportion of countries.”46 
                                                                 
regarding the science of climate change and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation efforts.”); Paris Agreement, supra note 12 (adopting the definition of 
“climate change litigation” first developed by David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An 
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or 
Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 27 (2012)). 
 41. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36, at 8. 
 42. Id. at 32-33 (citing David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy 
Environment, ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV, July-Aug. 2012, 
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2012/July-
August%202012/constitutional-rights-full.html). 
 43. Boyd, supra note 42, at 1 (cited in U.N. Environment Programme, The Status 
of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (May 2017) at 33, n.107). 
 44. Id. (indicating that among these holdouts, “some subnational governments 
recognize the right to a healthy environment, including six American states, five 
Canadian provinces or territories, and a growing number of cities.”). 
 45. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,251 (also noting “In framing the fundamental 
right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life, I 
intend to strike a balance and to provide some protection against the 
constitutionalization of all environmental claims.”). The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is currently considering a motion by the federal government to issue a writ 
of mandamus overturning this ruling. 
 46. Boyd, supra note 42, at 1. 
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A. The Netherlands 
Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands is perhaps the 
most important development for the role of the judiciary in 
establishing state duties to protect against hazardous climate change 
for two primary reasons.47 First, as the UNEP report noted, the ruling 
is 
pathbreaking in separation of powers jurisprudence because 
it grounded its instruction to the government to tighten 
emissions limits on a rights-based analysis rather than 
through reference to statutory requirements. Subsequent 
petitions and judicial decisions in Austria, Norway, 
Switzerland and Sweden . . . have similarly been grounded 
at least in part on rights-based theories.48 
Second, Urgenda appears to be the first time a court awarded relief 
ordering a national government to take affirmative steps to reduce the 
joint volume of national GHG emissions within its borders.49 Although 
this decision is under appeal, the Dutch government is moving ahead 
to implement the order,50 and cited the case as recently as October 19, 
2017 as the basis for its new 2020 emissions reduction target.51 
The Urgenda case followed the Urgenda Foundation’s unsuccessful 
request to the Dutch Prime Minister to “commit and undertake to 
                                                                 
 47. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. (Chamber for 
Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/
VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf; see also U.N. Environment 
Programme, supra note 36, at 15. 
 48. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 36. 
 49. Urgenda at ¶ 5.1 (Ordering “The State to limit the joint volume of Dutch 
annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited, so that this volume will have 
reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 1990, 
as claimed by Urgenda, in so far as acting on its own behalf. . . .”). 
 50. Gov’t of the Netherlands, Cabinet Begins Implementation of Urgenda Ruling 
but Will File Appeal, GOV’T OF NETHERLANDS (Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/09/01/cabinet-begins-implementation
-of-urgenda-ruling-but-will-file-appeal [http://perma.cc/RCB4-J4UV]. 
 51. Gov’t of the Netherlands, More Sustainable Energy than Expected in 2023, 
GOV’T OF NETHERLANDS (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.government.nl/latest/
news/2017/10/19/more-sustainable-energy-than-expected-in-2023 [http://perma.cc/
6D4A-46HC]. 
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reduce CO[2] emissions in the Netherlands by 40% by 2020, as 
compared to the emissions in 1990.”52 Notably for the discussion 
below, this is the precise reduction commitment Germany made, is off 
target to achieve,53 and had recently considered abandoning.54 
Urgenda Foundation subsequently brought suit, alleging “systemic 
responsibility” for the total greenhouse gas emissions in the country 
and breach of a duty of care “to ensure a reduction of the emission 
level of the Netherlands in order to prevent dangerous climate 
change.”55 The Urgenda Foundation relied on, inter alia, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),56 Article 21 of Dutch 
Constitution,57 and other international legal principles and 
conventions.58 The Urgenda Foundation’s environmental mission gave 
it standing under the Dutch civil code.59 
Armed with an abundance of scientific documentation on climate 
change, the court found actualized and foreseeable harms and ordered 
unambiguous relief.60 In sum, the court concluded “the Dutch 
                                                                 
 52. Urgenda at ¶ 2.6. 
 53. See Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety, German Climate Policy, COP23 Fiji, https://www.cop23.de/
en/bmub/german-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); Michael Bauchmüller, 
Deutschland hinkt seinem Klimaziel hinterher, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/klimawandel-deutschland-hinkt-seinem-
klimaziel-hinterher-1.3702329 (Ger.) (citing a leaked internal ministry paper that 
predicts Germany’s emissions will be 31.7 to 32.5 percent below 1990 levels). 
 54. See Niklas Höhne, Germany’s New Government Deal Fails the Paris Climate 
Accord Test, CLIMATE HOME NEWS, (Mar. 12, 2018), http://www.climate
changenews.com/2018/03/12/germanys-new-government-deal-fails-paris-climate-
accord-test/ [http://perma.cc/9UK3-JJ6R]; Guy Chazan and Tobias Buck, Carbon 
Targets on the Table in German Coalition Talks, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, (Jan. 8, 
2018) https://www.ft.com/content/d2572cec-f470-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00 [http://
perma.cc/6R4W-65ZC]. 
 55. See Urgenda at ¶ 3.2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Dutch Const. ch. 1, art. 21., https://www.government.nl/binaries/
government/documents/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-
of-the-netherlands-2008/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-
2008.pdf (stating “[i]t shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country 
habitable and to protect and improve the environment”). 
 58. Urgenda at ¶ 3.2 (citing the U.N. Climate Change Convention and the TFEU). 
 59. Id. at ¶ 4.6. 
 60. Id. at ¶¶ 2.8-2.69; 4.64 (noting that the threat of climate change “with 
irreversible and serious consequences for man and the environment” is undisputed, 
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reduction target is . . . below the standard deemed necessary . . . 
meaning that in order to prevent dangerous climate change Annex I 
countries61 (including the Netherlands) must reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25-40% by 2020 to realise [sic] the 2°C target.”62 This 
article does not repeat the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate 
change and its risks, which are conclusive by all credible accounts and 
enjoy international acceptance.63 Any reasonable court that considers 
the certainty and dangers of climate change would conclude the same. 
Turning to the basis for state liability, the court found that the 
Netherlands is violating a host of constitutional and international 
standards. However, the court also found that the Urgenda Foundation 
did not have a cause of action beyond the domestic civil law for which 
the court had jurisdiction.64 
According to the court, “Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution 
imposes a duty of care on the State relating to the livability of the 
country and the protection and improvement of the living 
environment,”65 but “[t]he manner in which this task should be carried 
out is covered by the government’s own discretionary powers.”66 The 
court also noted that although the Netherlands is bound by the ECHR, 
the UN Climate Change Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the “no 
harm” principle,67 the binding force of these “only involve[] 
                                                                 
and that the parties agree that the State should take precautionary measures for its 
citizens). 
 61. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, List of Annex I Parties 
to the Convention, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/
2774.php. “Annex I countries” refers to so-called “developed” countries that bear the 
bulk of responsibility for historic GHG emissions, and for taking the lead on 
reductions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 62. Urgenda at ¶ 4.31. 
 63. See e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/; Friedman, supra note 
10. 
 64. See generally Urgenda at ¶ 4.52. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 4.36. 
 66. Id. 
 67. “No harm” is a well-accepted duty under customary international law not to 
cause harm to other states. See e.g. Jeremy Suttenberg, Who Pays? The 
Consequences of State versus Operator Liability within the Context of 
Transboundary Environmental Nuclear Damage, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 201, 228-
243 (2016). 
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obligations towards other states[, not towards Urgenda].”68 Indeed, 
while environmental principles can be derived from the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights,69 the court stated that “Urgenda 
itself cannot directly rely on Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.”70 Nevertheless, 
the court found that these international instruments and principles still 
hold meaning, “namely in the question . . . whether the State has failed 
to meet its duty of care toward Urgenda.”71 In other words, all the 
provisions and international agreements that the court determined do 
not control still define the contours of the State’s “unwritten standard 
of care” within the Dutch Civil Code.72 This includes “unlawful 
hazardous negligence.”73 “This way, these obligations have a ‘reflex 
effect’ in national law.”74 
                                                                 
 68. Urgenda at ¶ 4.42 (“Urgenda therefore cannot directly rely on [the ‘no harm’] 
principle, the convention and the protocol.”). The court also concluded “Urgenda 
cannot be designated as a direct or indirect victim, within the meaning of Article 34 
ECHR, of a violation of Article 2 and 8 ECHR” because it is a legal person, not a 
“natural person” with physical integrity or personal privacy. Id. at ¶ 4.45. 
 69. Id. at ¶ 4.48 (describing the Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, 
published at the recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly and by order of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.). 
 70. Id. at ¶ 4.45. 
 71. Id. at ¶ 4.52. 
 72. Book 6, Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code reads: “1. A person who 
commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be attributed to 
him, must repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result thereof. 2. 
As a tortious act is regarded a violation of someone else’s right (entitlement) and an 
act or omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to 
unwritten law has to be regarded as proper social conduct, always as far as there was 
no justification for this behavior. 3. A tortious act can be attributed to the tortfeasor 
if it results from his fault or from a cause for which he is accountable by virtue of 
law or generally accepted principles (common opinion).” Art. 6:162 BW, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook 066.htm; see also Urgenda at ¶ 4.43 
(citing national-law open standards and concepts, including social propriety, 
reasonableness and propriety). 
 73. Urgenda at ¶ 4.53-54 (the jurisprudence on the doctrine of hazardous 
negligence was developed “to detail the requirement of acting with due care towards 
society.”). 
 74. Id. at ¶¶ 4.43 & 4.52; see also Roger Cox, A Climate Change Litigation 
Precedent - Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, CENTER FOR INT’L 
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION Paper No. 79, 10 (Nov. 4, 2015) (“Hence the court found 
that the stipulations included in the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the no-harm 
principle of international law need to be taken into account when determining the 
state’s duty of care in relation to climate change.”). 
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Regarding the “right to life” guaranteed by Article 2 of the ECHR, 
the court in Urgenda held that it could impose an affirmative 
obligation on States to protect from dangerous climate change: 
[I]n some situations Article 2 may also impose on public 
authorities a duty to take steps to guarantee the right to life 
when it is threatened by persons or activities not directly 
connected with the State. . . . In the context of the 
environment, Article 2 has been applied where certain 
activities endangering the environment are so dangerous that 
they also endanger human life.75 
Unlike in Germany, the Dutch Constitution does not contain an 
enumerated right to life, per se.76 Therefore, the Urgenda court relied 
in part on jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights to 
establish the state’s civil duty to protect. Reliance on rulings from the 
European Court for Human Rights may not be necessary under the 
German constitutional structure, although a German litigant could 
certainly do so.77 
For relief, the court ordered the Netherlands to “limit the joint 
volume of Dutch annual [GHG] emissions, or have them limited, so 
that this volume will have reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 
compared to the level of the year 1990.”78 The court determined that 
this is the minimum reduction level that all Annex I countries 
                                                                 
 75. Urgenda at ¶ 4.49 (The Hague Dist. Ct. Chamber for Comm. Affairs, June 
24, 2015) (quoting Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, Council of 
Europe (2012)). The Urgenda court also reviewed the Manual’s comments on Article 
8 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. See 
id. at ¶ 4.50 (“For an issue to arise under Article 8, the environmental factors must 
directly and seriously affect private and family life or the home. . . .”). 
 76. Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution guarantees the “right to inviolability of 
his person. . . .” The German Constitution separately guarantees both the right to life 
and the inviolability of his person. Compare GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] 
art. 2 (F.R.G.) with STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art. 11. 
 77. Urgenda at ¶ 4.74. See e.g. BverfG, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 82, 86 (The European 
Convention on Human Rights “must be relied on as an interpretation aid in the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights and rule-of-law principles of the Basic 
Law”). 
 78. Urgenda at ¶ 5.1. Urgenda had requested an emissions reduction of “40%, or 
at least 25%, as of the end of 2020. . . .” Id. at ¶ 4.104. 
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combined would need to achieve to keep the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 below a critical level.79 As discussed further 
below, Germany’s reductions meet the standard Urgenda imposed on 
the Netherlands, showing Urgenda may not be directly analogous to a 
potential suit in Germany. Regardless, the scientific and legal 
sufficiency of Germany’s climate efforts remains a likely question for 
the courts. 
Urgenda was groundbreaking in at least two distinct ways: it 
incorporated human rights standards into a domestic, civil duty of care 
related to climate change and granted relief that requires a national 
government to take specific climate action. Friends of the Irish 
Environment v. Ireland, et al. is similarly groundbreaking for its 
forceful pronouncement of a fundamental, unenumerated right vis-a-
vis climate change mitigation. 
B. Ireland 
Friends of the Irish Environment v. Ireland, et al. (FIE Airport Case) 
was initially brought as a challenge to an airport expansion. The suit 
failed to stop the opposed runway, but established a constitutional 
“right to an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and 
well-being of citizens at large” in Ireland.80 Still pending in the Irish 
High Court is a separate case brought by FIE to challenge the adequacy 
of the Irish government’s actions to avert dangerous climate change 
(hereafter “FIE Climate Case”).81 The litigants hope the FIE Climate 
                                                                 
 79. See id. at ¶¶ 4.29 & 4.31 (relying on, inter alia, conclusions of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Fourth 
Assessment Report (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/index.shtml). 
 80. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] 
IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21, 2017). 
 81. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Government of Ireland, Case No. 
2017/793 JR. (Irish High Court, filed Oct. 19, 2017). See also Press Release, Irish 
Government Taken to Court in Landmark Climate Case, FRIENDS OF THE IRISH 
ENV’T, Oct. 23, 2017, http://www.friendsoftheirishenvironment.org/climate-
case/17459-irish-government-taken-to-court-in-landmark-climate-case [http://
perma.cc/EY3X-GFFM]; Press Release, Landmark Climate Case against the Irish 
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Case will follow the trail blazed by Urgenda and should be bolstered 
by the constitutional right recognized in the Airport Case.82 
The FIE Airport Case is remarkable for its surprising significance. 
By all indications, FIE’s climate arguments were secondary to other 
arguments to stop the airport expansion. FIE’s primary arguments 
included those related to EU Directives and an Irish Planning and 
Development Act, among others.83 In addition, FIE also claimed that 
a new runway would increase GHG emissions and quicken climate 
change. Although FIE’s climate claim was not ultimately 
determinative of the runway question, the court’s declaration 
nevertheless provided a huge victory for environmental activists. 
FIE persuaded the court that there is scientific, 
theological/philosophical, and jurisprudential consensus concerning 
environmental rights. First, the court accepted “a scientific consensus 
concerning the centrality of (maintaining) the environment to continue 
human existence.”84 The court then extended this to climate change, 
finding “no doubt” that it threatens the environment on which 
continuing human existence relies.85 Second, the court acknowledged 
the theological/philosophical consensus on environmental matters, but 
did not rely on it for its legal analysis. 
What is perhaps most striking . . . [is] the commonality of 
views that appears to be shared by all of the major religions 
on matters environmental, as evidenced by the well-known 
Assisi Declarations of September 1986 in which 
distinguished leaders and personages from the Buddhist, 
Christian, Hindu, Islamic and Judaic faiths individually 
                                                                 
 82. See Press Release, Irish Government to Appear in Court in Landmark Climate 
Case, FRIENDS OF THE IRISH ENV’T, Dec. 10, 2017, http://www.friendsof
theirishenvironment.org/press-releases/17473-irish-government-to-appear-in-court-
in-landmark-climate-case [http://perma.cc/E4N8-RKGW] (Urgenda “proved that all 
governments have a legal duty to protect their citizens against climate change by 
doing their part to lower emissions”); see also id. (FIE is “greatly encouraged by the 
recent declaration by the High Court that citizens have a constitutional right to an 
environment that is consistent with human dignity and the well-being of citizens at 
large”). 
 83. See generally Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County 
Council. 
 84. Id. at ¶ 242. 
 85. See id. at ¶ 244 (citing IPCC documentation and expert opinions). 
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issued a series of declarations which point to humanity’s 
common destiny as the stewards and trustees of our shared 
natural environment. Notable too is secular environmental 
philosophy, whether as fashioned by the Deep Ecology 
Movement or in its more recent post-naturalistic form. . . .86 
Although the court made clear that it limited its analysis “solely to 
accepted legal reasoning,”87 this dicta provides normative credibility 
to the court’s subsequent legal ruling. No doubt, the vast majority of 
individuals would identify with one of the groups referenced. Finally, 
the court found legal support in the Irish constitution and the ECHR, 
rejecting the state’s arguments. In general, the court showed minimal 
concern with recognizing a previously unrecognized right, which 
courts have a willingness to do so long as the analysis is sound.88 The 
court noted “the certainties of yesterday can very quickly be overtaken 
by a fresh and very different comprehension of existence.”89 
Developments over the past twenty years have led to a “consensus as 
to the importance of the preservation of the environment,” making the 
time ripe for judicial recognition of the right.90 The court found it 
“difficult to see how the dignity and freedom of individuals is being 
assured if the natural environment on which their respective well-being 
is concerned is being progressively diminished.”91 
The court similarly dismissed concerns about the environmental 
right being ill-defined.92 Despite many open questions about the scope 
of this right, 
the court does not accept that all such issues require 
necessarily to be pre-identified (if they can all be identified) 
and also resolved before the contended-for existing 
constitutional right can be recognized as existing. Other 
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, and even 
                                                                 
 86. Id. at ¶ 242. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at ¶ 243 (citing McGee v. Attorney General [1974] IR 284 (Ir.)). 
 89. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] 
IEHC 695 (Nov. 21, 2017). 
 90. Id. at ¶ 246 (quoting Applicant). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at ¶ 254. 
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recognized but unenumerated constitutional rights, such as 
the right to bodily integrity, present similar complications, 
with their limits only capable of being defined, demarcated 
and better understood over time, and yet they are recognised 
[sic] to exist.93 
From the court’s perspective, there were many fundamental rights 
which “so-called ‘ordinary’ citizens, if approached today, would be 
astonished to learn had ever been the subject of legal controversy or 
dispute (much the court suspects, as the right contended for . . . is now, 
or will in the future, be seen).”94 And while caution is warranted, it is 
the role of the judiciary to identify unenumerated rights.95 
Enforceability was no barrier either. “Once concretised [sic] into 
specific duties and obligations, its enforcement is entirely 
practicable.”96 Specifics will be “defined and demarcated” over time.97 
“[T]o start down that path of definition and demarcation, one first has 
to recognise [sic] that there is a personal constitutional right to an 
environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well-being 
of citizens at large and upon which those duties and responsibilities 
will be constructed.”98 The court recognized the unenumerated right 
under the Irish Constitution with reference to the right to life (Article 
40.3), right to work (Articles 50 and/or 45), right to private property 
(Article 43), and the European Convention on Human Rights.99 
Indeed, the court concluded that “[a] right to an environment that is 
consistent with the human dignity and well-being of citizens at large 
                                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at ¶ 256. 
 95. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., 
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 257 (Nov. 21, 2017) (“[I]f the rule of law, in the form 
contemplated and tolerated by the people, is not to descend to the arbitrary rule of 
whoever comprises the current representative majority from time to time, then the 
only agency available to put rights, including unenumerated constitutional rights, 
between the claims of the executive or legislative and those of so-called ‘ordinary’ 
people, is the judicial branch of the tripartite government that the people have 
established directly.”). 
 96. Id. at ¶ 264. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at ¶¶ 263 (also citing arts. 40.3.2 & 44.2.6) & 269 (citing Taskin and Ors 
v. Turkey (ECHR App. No. 46117/99)). 
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is an essential condition for the fulfillment of all human rights. It is an 
indispensable existential right that is enjoyed universally.”100 
Courts in the Netherlands, Ireland and other states have signaled to 
the world that judges are open to finding rights-based state-duties to 
combat climate-change. Seeing the success of the litigants in those 
jurisdictions, German environmentalists will likely find the prospect 
of a similar complaint in the German Constitutional Court too enticing 
to resist. 
III. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Germany stands among the more aggressive industrialized nations 
at reducing its GHG emissions. The government has set relatively 
ambitious reduction targets compared to other nations, but Germany is 
not expected to meet those targets and recently considered abandoning 
them.101 Measured against the actions of other countries, Germany 
would not be a convincing setting for a rights-based climate change 
lawsuit. However, measuring Germany’s national actions against its 
own prior targets, or against scientific prescriptions, makes the forum 
more favorable. A healthy planet would face long, perhaps 
insurmountable, odds if every nation misses their targets as Germany 
did. Regardless of the wisdom of a constitutional complaint under the 
Grundgesetz, litigation is likely in light of global trends and the legal 
regime in Germany that makes it possible. 
First, Germany has a relatively liberal access to justice regime for 
constitutional complaints, which “may be filed by any person alleging 
that one of his basic rights or one of his rights under [certain articles] 
has been infringed by public authority.”102 The complaint must merely 
“specify the right which has allegedly been violated, as well as the act 
or omission of the organ or authority by which the complainant claims 
his or her rights have been violated.”103 Under the Grundgesetz, the 
Constitutional Court “shall rule” on the interpretation of the Basic Law 
concerning “the extent of the rights and duties of a supreme federal 
                                                                 
 100. Id. at ¶ 264. 
 101. See Höhne, supra note 5. 
 102. G.G. art. 93(1)(4a); see also BVerfGG § 90(1). 
 103. BVerfGG § 92 (emphasis added). 
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body. . . .”104 And under the Richterliche Hinweispflicht principle, 
judges help facilitate the right to be heard105 by providing opportunities 
for parties to correct matters that could be grounds for dismissal—
increasing the probability of reaching the merits of the claims.106 
Second, the German principle of Schutzpflich, or duty to protect, 
bolsters the merit of a rights-based climate complaint and the 
availability of relief. As one scholar explained, Schutzpflich “means 
that the individual whose constitutionally protected interests may be 
infringed upon by third parties has a claim against the state if the 
existing laws do not protect him or her sufficiently.”107 Thus, the 
Constitutional Court could order the legislature to take action if its 
failure to act violates a right.108 Specifically, this means that “the 
legislature loses the power to remain inactive vis-a-vis a manifest 
danger for a fundamental right. . . . The power lost by the legislature is 
gained by the Constitutional Court.”109 This regime is markedly 
different from the United States and bolsters the justiciability of a 
climate complaint.110 
                                                                 
 104. G.G. art. 93(1)(1). See also BVerfGG § 67 (“The Federal Constitutional 
Court shall declare in its decision whether the respondent’s contested act or omission 
violates a provision of the Basic Law. The provision is to be specified. In the 
operative part of the decision the Federal Constitutional Court may at the same time 
decide on a point of law which is relevant for interpreting the provision of the Basic 
Law on which the declaration pursuant to the first sentence depends.”). 
 105. G.G. art. 103.1. 
 106. See Robert W. Emerson, Judges as Guardian Angels: The German Practice 
of Hints and Feedback, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 707 (2015). 
 107. GEORG NOLTE, EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM (2005), at 128. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. See also DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 58 (3rd 
ed. 2012) (“A basic [constitutional] right is a negative right against the state, but this 
right also represents a value, and as a value it imposes a positive obligation on the 
state to ensure that it becomes an integral part of the general legal order.” (citing 
Peter Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. 
L. REV. 247, 261 (1989))). 
 110. Compare with Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 
189 (1989) (no obligation of state to act to protect against private individuals, in this 
case to protect a regularly beaten boy from his father, despite repeated alerts to the 
county) (discussed in GEORG NOLTE ED., EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 
153 (Council of Eur. Pub. 2005); see also KOMMERS &MILLER, supra note 109, at 
60. 
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Finally, although in Germany there is “no fundamental right which 
explicitly guarantees any particular condition of the environment,”111 
scholars recognize the possibility that a court could infer such a right. 
One could infer the right from “the intentions of the constitutional 
legislature . . . starting with the hypothesis that these intentions have 
not always been made clear or, in other words, that it is permissible to 
take account of changed views about society and thereby promote 
consistent further development of the existing written provisions.”112 
As discussed above, the Irish High Court had no problem adopting this 
method of interpretation.113 And there is precedent for the German 
Constitutional Court to interpret the Basic Law in this way.114 The 
inference could happen either through the examination of individual 
basic rights or deriving the interpretation from the Basic Law as a 
whole.115 As one scholar articulated, “[t]he argument has been put 
forward that the individual positive guarantees in the Basic Law are 
merely particular manifestations of a comprehensive environmental 
basic right which stands behind these individual manifestations, as it 
were, and which these individual guarantees enable us to infer.”116 
A. Grundgesetz Article 20a 
Any analysis of an environmental constitutional right in Germany 
should begin with Article 20a, a manifestly appealing, albeit rather 
toothless authority for a state-duty to mitigate climate change. Article 
20a of the Grundgesetz states: 
                                                                 
 111. P. Kunig, German Constitutional Law and the Environment, 8 ADEL. L. REV. 
318, 324 (1983) (cited with approval by KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at ch. 
1, n.41). 
 112. Id. at 324. 
 113. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., 
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶¶ 243-246 (Nov. 21, 2017); see also Juliana v. US, 217 F. Supp. 
3d 1,224, 1,249 (“The genius of the Constitution is that its text allows ‘future 
generations [to] protect . . . the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its 
meaning.’” (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015))). 
 114. See e.g. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 324 (citing inference of the “rule of law” 
principle, discussed in K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
vol. 1 § 20 IV (1977)). 
 115. Id. at 324, 330. 
 116. Id. at 330. 
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[m]indful also of its responsibility toward future 
generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of 
life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with the 
law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within 
the framework of the constitutional order.117 
Climate change, with its delayed and profound adverse impacts, 
epitomizes a threat to future generations. At first glance, Article 20a 
appears to explicitly impose a responsibility on the state to protect the 
natural environment through “judicial action,” implying a cause of 
action.118 However, as revealed below, the legislative record shows 
that preclusion of an individual right was a priority for the majority 
that passed Article 20a.119 The framers simply did not want to 
empower citizens to bring constitutional complaints under Article 20a. 
But what, if anything, does Article 20a actually prescribe with its 
striking language? A review of the competing proposals and legislative 
debate helps answer this question. 
1. Legislative History 
The constitutional amendment adding Article 20a passed in 1994 
after two decades of attempts.120 To be sure, climate change was not at 
the forefront of the political psyche when this debate started, but by 
1987 at least one legislator already cited the importance of a “globally 
                                                                 
 117. GRUNDGESETZ, [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 20a. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 120. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 12/238 (June 30, 1994) 
(Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/12/12238.pdf; see also DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr. 2, 1987) (Ger.), 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statement of Dr. Hauff) 
(debating Drucksache 11/10) (“For several years, the SPD parliamentary group has 
called for the simple and clear sentence to be included in our constitution . . . this 
problem was first addressed in a government document - the Federal Environment 
Agency’s Environmental Report - in 1974.” (author’s translation)). A subsequent 
amendment added “and animals” to Article 20a in 2002. See Kate Nattrass, “Und 
Die Tiere” Constitutional Protection for Germany’s Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283 
(2004). 
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stable climate” to future generations as a basis for adding an 
environmental amendment through Article 20a.121 
A significant point of disagreement among the political factions 
considering Article 20a was whether an environmental amendment 
should provide a “fundamental right,” or merely a “state goal” 
(Staatziel), with legislators opining on the functional differences 
between the two. In the 1980s, the Social Democrats (SPD) advocated 
for Article 20a to be a simple sentence: “The natural foundations of 
life are under the special protection of the state.”122 The SPD saw this 
as a “state goal” and argued it would enshrine nature protection as “a 
commitment for all state action.”123 From the SPD’s perspective, such 
a state goal would permit the Constitutional Court to intervene “only 
in a gross neglect or even disregard of the protection of the 
environment.”124 The SPD “oppose[d] the inclusion of a fundamental 
right to environmental protection in our Constitution” precisely 
because it could shift environmental decisions from the legislature to 
the courts.125 Debate did not clarify how the SPD believed the 
Constitutional Court would have jurisdiction where environmental 
protection is “grossly disregarded,” but in SPD’s view the court would 
have a role.126 To them, “[s]tate goals [such as this proposal] are 
constitutional norms with legally binding effect, which also give the 
Constitutional Court more control over public action and, to a greater 
extent in the future, also against public neglect.”127 
                                                                 
 121. See e.g. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 379 (Apr. 2, 
1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of 
Dr. Hauff) (also referencing water quality degradation, smog, solid waste, 
Chernobyl, and chemical accidents on the Rhine, among other environmental 
problems) (author’s translation). 
 122. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 11/10, (Feb. 18, 1987) (Ger.), 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/000/1100010.pdf (author’s translation) 
(original German: “Die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen stehen unter dem besonderen 
Schutz des Staates.”); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr. 
2, 1987) (Ger.) (statements of Dr. Hauff) (debating Drucksache 11/10). 
 123. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8 378 (Apr. 2, 1987) (Ger.), 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of Dr. Hauff) 
(debating Drucksache 11/10) (author’s translation). 
 124. Id. at 379 (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation). 
 125. Id. (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation). 
 126. Id. (author’s translation). 
 127. Id. at 380 (statements of Dr. Hauff) (author’s translation). 
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The Free Democrats (FDP), a junior coalition partner from 1969 to 
1998 in federal governments headed by both the SPD and Christian 
Democrats (CDU)128 at various times, largely agreed with SPD’s 
position.129 To the FDP, “[a] state goal is a duty to act for the 
legislature, a normative guideline.”130 With a state goal, environmental 
protection would receive greater weight in the interpretation of the law 
and thus “bind all three branches of government,” but without a private 
cause of action.131 
In 1987, a CDU representative expressed skepticism that any 
constitutional amendment was necessary at all, but the party ultimately 
agreed to add nature protection as a state goal: 
No one in this House doubts that the protection and care of 
natural resources is an essential task of the state. It is just as 
natural as the duty of the state to provide for internal peace. 
Both tasks of the state are not explicitly mentioned in our 
constitution. This has never prevented this coalition from 
acting in both fields and, in particular, enforcing a host of 
concrete measures against the further burden on the 
environment. . . . Nevertheless, ladies and gentlemen, the 
coalition has decided to include environmental protection as 
a state goal in the Basic Law. It should not be concealed that 
this decision has been thoroughly controversial in the 
coalition. . . .132 
The CDU representative, Horst Eylmann, also suggested that adding 
an enumerated state goal would be redundant because of rights 
guaranteed by other constitutional provisions. Eylmann stated “one 
can assert that the state objective of environmental protection results 
indirectly from some norms of the Basic Law. For example, a public 
duty to protect the citizens from environmental damage and 
environmental hazards can be derived from the right to life and 
                                                                 
 128. For purposes of this article, “Christian Democrats” refer to both the Christian 
Democratic Union, and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union. 
 129. See id. at 383 (statements of Baum). The FDP had supported the inclusion of 
environmental protection in the Basic Law since 1971. 
 130. Id. (statements of Baum) (author’s translation). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 380-81 (statements of Eylmann) (author’s translation). 
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physical integrity.”133 Although Eylmann meant to undermine the 
necessity of the amendment in the first place, his statement could also 
be interpreted as unintentionally supporting an unenumerated right to 
a healthy environment derived from Article 2 Grundgesetz, and other 
fundamental rights. 
As for the Green Party, it believed “the incorporation of 
environmental protection as a state objective in the Basic Law is not 
enough. . . . The protection of the environment must be a fundamental 
right. . . .”134 The Green Party’s concern was that “[t]he SPD’s bill 
offer[ed] no guarantee that the individual can really defend himself in 
reference to the Basic Law.”135 Like the CDU member, the Green 
representative also cited Article 2’s “right to life,” arguing Article 2 
already implicates environmental rights, but requires clarification with 
a new, enumerated fundamental right. The Green Party representative 
stated: 
[t]he Basic Law and Human Rights . . . also include a 
fundamental right to an intact environment, Mr. Eylmann. I 
fully agree with you. However, the SPD writes that the 
current constitutional law does not guarantee a satisfactory 
protection of natural resources. Yes, what does Article 2(2) 
sentence 1 say? Everyone has the right to life and [physical] 
integrity. . . . This includes the right to clean air, healthy 
water, non-toxic foods, etc. How else should the physical 
integrity be guaranteed, ladies and gentlemen?136 
The Green Party subsequently proposed additions to Articles 2 and 
20 G.G., in lieu of a new Article 20a.137 In so doing, the Greens 
                                                                 
 133. Id. at 381. 
 134. Id. at 382 (statements of Garbe) (author’s translation). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 11/633, Gesetzentwurf der Fraktion 
Die Grünen (Aug. 4, 1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/006/
1100663.pdf. The Greens’ proposal also included amendments to Articles 14 and 28. 
The proposal included the following additions (shown in italics) (author’s 
translation): 
Article 2(2): Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity, the 
preservation of its natural resources and protection against significant damage to 
its natural environment. 
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explained that “[t]hose who want to move forward in terms of 
environmental policy must give people what they rightfully demand, 
namely more freedom of action and concrete rights. They must be able 
to assert the destruction of natural resources as a violation of their 
personal rights in court.”138 The Bundestag, the German federal 
parliament, rejected this proposal in September 1990.139 Had the Green 
Party succeeded, a constitutional claim on climate change mitigation 
would be much more straightforward. 
In the end, the government adopted compromise language for a 
“state goal,” as it is now enshrined. The Federal Government’s official 
view of the passed amendment once again clarified that it created no 
individual right or private cause of action, while still envisioning some 
role for the judiciary.140 
2. Application of Grundgesetz Article 20a 
Even if Article 20a does not provide an individual right or cause of 
action, a rights-based constitutional complaint is still likely to rely on 
and cite it extensively. The state goal is certainly relevant, although the 
German Constitutional Court has devoted little time to fleshing out the 
implications of Article 20a. The Constitutional Court suggested 
Article 20a “may require taking measures for the protection against 
threats,” including from climate change, but did not indicate how that 
requirement would be enforced and did not elaborate what constitutes 
a threat.141 In an earlier case, the Court had shown deference to the 
                                                                 
Article 20(1): The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal 
state. The natural environment is the basis of human life and for its own sake is under 
the special protection of the state. In the case of conflicts between ecological 
resilience and economic needs, priority must be given to environmental issues if 
otherwise there is a significant threat of deterioration of the natural environment. 
 138. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/277, 17,966 (Sept. 21, 
1990) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11227.pdf#P.17969 (statement of 
Häfner) (author’s translation). 
 139. Id. at 17,974. 
 140. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, DRUCKSACHE 12/7109, 7-9 (Mar. 17, 1994) 
(Ger.) (“the wording does not contain any subjective and thus enforceable claims. . . . 
At the same time, the text outlines the co-responsibility of the jurisprudence and the 
administration for the protection of natural resources.” (author’s translation)). 
 141. In re Aviation Tax Act, BVerfG, Judgment of the First Senate, 1BvF 3/11 ¶ 
47 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20141105_1bvf000311en.html. 
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government’s assessment of the relative impacts of lignite mining and 
power generation that could conflict with Article 20a.142 
In most instances, the court cites Article 20a to justify a state action 
that is in tension with another constitutional right. For example, in a 
case reviewing regulations of genetically modified organisms (GMO), 
the court cited Article 20a (among other constitutional provisions) to 
justify the state’s infringement on otherwise protected academic 
freedoms.143 In another case, the court cited Article 20a to explain and 
justify the state’s decision to expedite the phase-out of nuclear 
energy.144 The court generally handles Article 20’s social state 
principle145 in a similar manner.146 
In the climate change context, Article 20a would add value to a 
rights-based climate complaint for at least two reasons. First, Article 
20a may provide interpretive guidance to the Constitutional Court to 
prioritize stronger environmental protection when interpreting other 
constitutional or statutory language pertinent to the complaint. As a 
                                                                 
 142. Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland Landesverband Nordrhien-
Westfalen e.V. v. Federal Administrative Court, BVerfG,, Judgment Spruchkoerper, 
1 BvR 3139/08, ¶ 298 (Dec. 17, 2013) (“The assessment of the serious impact on 
people and the environment that undisputedly follows from mining of lignite and its 
use for power generation is subject to the execute and legislative branches’ political 
prerogative of assessment, also with regard to the constitutional values of Art. 14 § 
1 & Art. 20a GG.”). 
 143. In re Act on the Regulation of Genetic Engineering, BVerfG, Judgment of 
the First Senate, 1 BvF 2/05 ¶ 23 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.bverfg.de/e/
fs20101124_1bvf000205en.html. 
 144. In re Thirteenth Act Amending the Atomic Energy Act, BVerfG, Judgment 
of the First Senate, 1 BvR 2821/11 ¶ 283 (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.bverfg.de/e/
rs20161206_1bvr282111en.html. In the Nuclear case, the Court seemed to equate 
the right to life at Article 2(2) G.G. and Article. 20a G.G: “[T]here are concerns 
relating to the fundamentally high-value protected interests of the life and health of 
the people (G.G. art. 2 § 2 sentence 1) and the natural foundations of life (G.G. art. 
20a), which the acceleration of the nuclear phase-out contributes to.” Id. at ¶ 366. As 
discussed above, Article 2(2) provides a fundamental right, while Article 20a 
established a state goal - distinct classifications of different legal weight. 
 145. G.G art. 20 provides certain “constitutional principles,” more akin to state 
goals than fundamental rights, such as the social state principle, which provides 
“[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.” G.G. 
art. 20 § 1. 
 146. See Inga Markovits, Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: 
Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,307, 1,340 (2008). 
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Bundestag member stated during debate regarding the state goal in 
Article 20a: 
[e]nvironmental protection receives a higher weight in the 
interpretation of the laws, in the specification of indefinite 
legal concepts, in the exercise of discretion . . . [and] is 
important for the judicial application of law. . . .147 
In a case of first impression, the Court’s analysis of an inferred state 
duty – either derived from one or more specific fundamental rights, or 
from the Grundgesetz as a whole – will inevitably involve passages 
subject to competing interpretations. Article 20a suggests that 
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of increased environmental 
protection, which could tilt the balance of any ruling. At a minimum, 
since Article 20a’s state goal affects the overall constitutional order, it 
could play a significant role in the Court’s analysis of possible rights 
derived from the Basic Law as a whole.148 
Second, even though there are substantial jurisdictional barriers to 
the Court adjudicating a substantive Article 20a claim alone, other 
accompanying fundamental rights claims under Articles 1-19 (as 
discussed below) could bootstrap in an Article 20a claim in its own 
right. Under Article 93(1)(4a) G.G. and 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz (“Federal Constitutional Court Act,” 
or “BverfGG”) section 90(1), the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction 
over alleged state violations of fundamental rights and some other 
provisions, not including Article 20a.149 However, “[o]nce a complaint 
is properly admitted the [C]ourt might perhaps be obliged by virtue of 
its office to consider the compatibility of the law at issue with other 
                                                                 
 147. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 383 (Apr. 2, 1987) 
(Ger.) (statements of Baum) (author’s translation). 
 148. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 12/238, 20,969 (June 30, 
1994) (Ger.) (statement of Finance Minister Dr. Theodor Waigel), 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/12/12238.pdf; DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, 
PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/227, 17,969-70 (Sept. 21, 1990) (Ger.) (statement of Justice 
Minister Engelhard), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11227.pdf#P.17969; P. 
Kunig, supra note 111, at 325 & 330. 
 149. See also Michael Singer, The Constitutional Court of the German Federal 
Republic: Jurisdiction over Individual Complaints, 31 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 331, 339 
(1982). 
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constitutional provisions.”150 This should also apply to alleged 
unconstitutional acts or omissions, including those related to climate 
change mitigation.151 Thus, with jurisdiction over a complaint 
regarding the state’s violation of Article 2 G.G., for example, the 
Constitutional Court would be free to rule on a related alleged violation 
of the state’s “responsibility toward future generations” under Article 
20a.152 Put another way, “[a] weak claim which, although formally 
admissible, might if brought alone be summarily dismissed may still 
be adequate to support a substantially stronger claim which, if brought 
alone, would be inadmissible.”153 This is not to say that the 
jurisdictional limitations of BVerfGG section 90(1) have no meaning, 
rather the Court enjoys discretion to consider otherwise non-
cognizable claims that accompany claims for which its jurisdiction is 
enumerated. Perhaps in this manner, a rights-based climate suit will 
prompt the Constitutional Court to elucidate what, if any, duties arise 
from the mandates of Article 20a. As one scholar wrote, “Article 20a 
does not entitle individuals to sue the state . . . [but] if the legislature 
drags its feet in passing needed environmental legislation, the 
Constitutional Court would probably find ways to remind it of its 
duty.”154 
Despite its powerful language directing the state to “protect the 
natural foundations of life” as a “responsibility toward future 
generations,” a constitutional climate change complaint will need 
more than just Article 20a. As enacted, Article 20a was never intended 
to provide a cognizable fundamental right. On the other hand, the same 
is true for Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, which similarly 
provides “[i]t shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country 
habitable and to protect and improve the environment.” Despite the 
wide latitude given to the Dutch legislature to implement this article, 
the Urgenda court held it “imposes a duty of care on the State relating 
to the livability of the country and the protection and improvement of 
                                                                 
 150. Id. at 341(quoting BVerfGE 6,376 [385]) (cited with approval by Kommers 
and Miller at ch. 1, n.41). 
 151. See e.g. BVerfGG § 92. 
 152. G.G. art. 20a. 
 153. Singer, supra note 149, at 341. 
 154. Markovits, supra note 146, at 1341-42. 
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the living environment,”155 and found a way to hold the government 
liable for its failure to protect.156 In Germany, once a litigant alleges 
the violation of a fundamental right and thereby confers jurisdiction on 
the constitutional complaint, the German Constitutional Court could 
find a similar “duty of care on the State,” derived from G.G. Article 
20a. 
B. Fundamental Rights 
Unlike with constitutional state goals, there is no question that under 
German law “persons” have a cause of action against the state for 
violations of fundamental rights, including a failure to protect.157 The 
far reaching effects of unmitigated climate change potentially impact 
a host of fundamental rights. This section focuses on Grundgesetz 
Articles 2, 3 and 14, but creative arguments are also available for 
claims under less obvious provisions. While a complaint could, for 
example, argue that heat waves of increased intensity and frequency 
threaten farmers’ families (Article 6) and livelihood (Article 12), these 
claims are probably more tenuous.158 In a constitutional complaint, a 
                                                                 
 155. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 4.36 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf. 
 156. See Urgenda at ¶ 4.36 (The Hague Dist. Ct. Chamber for Comm. Affairs, 
June 24, 2015); Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische 
Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Federal Administrative Court, Nov. 25, 2016) translated 
in http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/request_KlimaSenior
innen.pdf (arguing “Although these provisions contain neither specific instructions 
nor legislative mandates or constitutional rights, they are still a ‘legally binding 
action guideline’ and have ‘programmatic significance.’” (internal citations 
omitted)). In Switzerland, the constitution also provides “aims,” including 
“sustainable development,” and “the long term preservation of natural resources. . . 
.” Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, arts. 2(2) and 2(4), translated in 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/201709240000/
101.pdf. 
 157. G.G. art. 93(1)(4a); BVerfGG § 90(1). 
 158. See e.g., Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,242 (One plaintiff “alleges record-
setting temperatures harm the health of the hazelnut orchard on his family farm, an 
important source of both revenue and food for his and his family”); id. at 1,250 
(“[Plaintiffs] assert the government has caused pollution and climate change on a 
catastrophic level, and that if the government’s actions continue unchecked, they will 
permanently and irreversibly damage plaintiffs’ property, their economic 
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German litigant is more likely to focus on the rights to life (Article 2), 
equal protection (Article 3), and property (Article 14). 
Each of these rights should be read in the context of and supported 
by the inviolability of human dignity, enumerated at Article 1 G.G.159 
In the words of scholars Donald Kommers and Russell Miller, the 
German Bill of Rights “are bound together in an organic unity” with 
Article 1, which informs “the substance and spirit of the entire 
[constitution].”160 Article 1’s inseparability is particularly true for 
Articles 2 and 3.161 Therefore, a rights-based climate complaint is sure 
to emphasize that under Article 1 G.G., the state has a duty to protect 
human dignity, which is threatened by the impacts of climate change. 
As Kunig argued, Article 1’s concomitant right “to lead a life which is 
essentially self-determined . . . is obviously placed in jeopardy if the 
individual is deprived of possibilities of development by poor 
environmental conditions which affect his physical and emotional 
well-being.” 162 In fact, the court in FIE v. Ireland framed the very right 
it recognized as “[a] right to an environment that is consistent with the 
human dignity and well-being of citizens at large.”163 Beginning to 
elucidate that right in dictum, the Irish High Court asserted “[i]t is 
difficult to see how the dignity and freedom of individuals is being 
assured if the natural environment on which their respective well-being 
                                                                 
livelihood . . . their health, and ultimately their (and their children’s) ability to live 
long, healthy lives.”). 
 159. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 355. 
 160. Id. (citing Peter Haberle, “Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der staatlichen 
Gemeinschaft,” in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND (8 vols.), eds. Josef Insenee & Paul Kirchhof 1:815-61 (Heidelberg: 
C.G. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1987) (additional citation omitted)). 
 161. Id.; see also BERTRAND MATHIEU, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW 12 (2006) (“[t]he right to life, like 
other rights and perhaps more so than any other right, follows directly from the 
principle of human dignity”). 
 162. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 330 (further stating, “it has been argued that Art. 
1 (1) of the Basic Law points to an (unwritten) defensive right against conduct which 
damages the environment.”) (citing CHR SENING, BEDROHTE 
ERHOLUNGSLANDSCHAFT. ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZU IHREM RECHTLICHEN Schutz 166 
(1977); A ROSSNAGEL, GRUNDRECHTE UND KERNKRAFTWERK 42 (1979)). 
 163. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., 
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 264 (Nov. 21 2017) (calling it “an essential condition for the 
fulfilment of all human rights”). 
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is concerned is being progressively diminished.”164 A German litigant 
is sure to echo this sentiment in the context of climate change. As “a 
rather flexible concept,”165 the complaint could frame Article 1’s 
human dignity guarantee in manners that elevate each of the other 
fundamental rights. 
1. Right to Life 
The right to life in Article 2(2) of the Grundgesetz is the most likely 
enumerated fundamental right on which a climate change 
constitutional complaint could rest.166 Article 2 G.G. reads: 
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of 
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral 
law. 
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical 
integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These 
rights may be interfered with only pursuant to law.167 
Urgenda and several opinions of the European Court of Justice have 
interpreted a similar “right to life” in ECHR Article 2 to encompass 
protection from various foreseeable environmental harms and natural 
disasters.168 Although technically subordinate to the Basic Law, in 
                                                                 
 164. Id. at ¶ 246. 
 165. David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 333, 358 (1989). 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“Article 2(2) has also been the most prolific source of 
decision recognizing the affirmative duty of the state to protect the individual from 
harm inflicted by third parties.”). 
 167. G.G. art. 2 (emphasis added). 
 168. Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 4.49 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal) (quoting Manual on 
Human Rights and the Environment, Council of Europe (2012)), 
http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-
24.06.2015.pdf; see also L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 23413/94 ¶ 
36., Öneryildiz v. Turkey [GC], Application no. 48939/99, Borysiewicz v. Poland, 
Application no. 71146/01 ¶ 53.; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Application no. 
15339/02.; Murillo Saldias and Others v. Spain, Application no. 76973/01 (all cited 
in Complaint of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische 
Bundeskanzlei (Nov. 2016) (decision pending)); see generally BERTRAND MATHIEU, 
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Germany the ECHR and its interpretation by the European Court of 
Human Rights “must be relied on as an interpretation aid in the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights and rule-of-law principles of 
the Basic Law.”169 Moreover, the “right to life” in Article 40.3 of the 
Irish Constitution and Article 9 of the Pakistani Constitution have been 
interpreted to entail environmental rights in their respective 
jurisdictions.170 Additional pending complaints also assert the right to 
climate protection under other “right to life” provisions.171 Indeed, 
“[m]any scholars have argued that because clean air, clean water, 
fertile soil and functioning ecosystems are integral to human survival 
and well-being, they must be included in the rights to life and 
health.”172 
It is easy to see how an argument under Article 2(2) G.G. could take 
shape in Germany. During debate on the environmental amendment to 
the Basic Law, the Greens emphasized that Article 2 necessarily 
“includes the right to clean air” and other environmental protections, 
without which the enumerated rights are compromised.173 And as 
Kunig explained in his analysis of Article 2, “[t]he right to life can 
                                                                 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE-LAW 
11-14 (2006) (comparing right to life in ECHR and European national constitutions). 
 169. BverfG, Judgment of the Second Senate, 2 BvR 2365/09, ¶ 86-94 (May 4, 
2011), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/
2011/05/rs20110504_2bvr236509en.html. This “serves to give the guarantees of the 
European Convention on Human Rights as extensive an application in the Federal 
Republic of Germany as possible. . . .” Id. at. ¶ 90. A complete analysis of ECHR 
jurisprudence vis-à-vis a state duty to protect from climate change is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 170. See Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., 
[2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 263 (Nov. 21, 2017); Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan, Case No. 
W.P. No. 25501/2015, Order, 5-6 ¶ 7 (Lahore High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), 
https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf. 
 171. See, e.g., Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Schweizerische 
Bundeskanzlei, Complaint (Federal Administrative Court, Nov. 25, 2016) (citing 
Article 10 of the Swiss Constitution) translated in http://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/request_KlimaSeniorinnen.pdf. 
 172. David R. Boyd, The Implicit Constitutional Right to Live in a Healthy 
Environment, 20 REV. EUROPEAN COMM’Y & INT’L ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (citation 
omitted). 
 173. See, e.g., DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 382 (Apr. 2, 
198) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statements of 
Frau Garbe). 
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become relevant in environmental law if the government avails itself, 
or permits or tolerates measures which adversely affect the 
environment and endanger life.”174 This framing has its limitations, to 
be sure, but a complainant could argue climate change is a unique 
existential threat to the protected right to life. The complainant could 
argue that the government is permitting and tolerating an energy 
consumption system – ranging from lignite mining and coal burning 
to fossil fuel-based transportation – that endangers life by exacerbating 
climate change. 
A case challenging the German government’s consent to the storage 
of American chemical weapons in Germany, the Chemical Weapons 
Case, helps illuminate how the court would handle a climate change 
claim under Article 2.175 In Chemical Weapons, the complainants 
argued, inter alia, the state’s failure to prevent or adequately regulate 
the storage of chemical weapons exposed them to unconstitutional 
risks of bodily harm in the event of accidents or sabotage.176 They 
argued this “neglected the protective obligations incumbent on it [the 
state], arising out of the objective legal content of the basic right to life 
and inviolability of the person.”177 The court ultimately denied the 
claim under the particular facts of the case, but did not rule out a 
different outcome in other cases. The court cited the government’s 
broad powers to assess and evaluate its own compliance with the 
protective obligations under Article 2, which “can be reviewed by the 
courts only to a limited extent, depending on the nature of the area at 
issue, the possibilities of arriving at an adequately certain judgment 
and the importance of the legal goods at stake.”178 
                                                                 
 174. P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 325 (citing J. Schabe, Krankenversorgung und 
Verfassungsrecht, 22 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2,274 (1969)). 
 175. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling, 
Oct. 29, 1987, translated in https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/german/case.php?id=568. Regarding procedural matters, the court found 
standing despite an uncertainty regarding the location of the chemical weapons in 
Germany (id. at ¶ IV.B.2.b) and determined there were no statute of limitations issues 
because the complaint was directed at an omission by the public authorities (id. at ¶ 
IV.B.2.b.bb (indicating that the time limits of BVerfGG ¶ 93 do not apply in that 
situation)). 
 176. Id. at ¶ IV.B.2.b.cc (internal citation omitted). 
 177. Id. at ¶ A.II.3 (citing G.G. art. 2(2)). 
 178. Id. at ¶ IV.B.I.2.b.2.cc (citing BVerfGE 50, 290 [332 f.]). 
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Despite rejecting the claims, the court in Chemical Weapons 
reaffirmed that a constitutional complaint is an appropriate vehicle for 
seeking protection under Article 2 G.G.179 The court noted that: 
[t]he fact that Article 2(2), first sentence, Basic Law does not 
merely guarantee a subjective right to protection but at the 
same time constitutes an objective legal value-decision of 
the constitution applying in all areas of the legal system and 
establishing constitutional protective obligations has been 
recognized in a consistent case law on both Senates of the 
Federal Constitutional Court.180 
Granted, “[i]t is only in very special circumstances” that the court 
may restrict the government’s freedom of action,181 but a climate 
litigant could argue insufficient protection against the profound and 
certain threats from climate change constitutes a very special 
circumstance. Faced with substantial evidence, courts in other 
jurisdictions have overcome similar separation of powers barriers.182 
The Chemical Weapons court also provided a test for future Article 
2 constitutional complaints, such as a climate complaint. Any 
complainant must “conclusively show” that the public authorities have 
(1) “either not taken protective measures at all,” or (2) “that manifestly 
the regulations and measures adopted are entirely unsuitable or 
completely inadequate to secure the object of protection.”183 The 
                                                                 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (citing BVerfGE 39, 1 [41 f.]; 46, 160 [164]; 49, 89 [141 f.]; 53, 30 [57]; 
56, 54 [73, 78, 80]). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf; Friends of the Irish 
Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, et al., [2017] IEHC 695 ¶ 263 (Nov. 
21, 2017); Leghari v. Republic of Pakistan, Case No. W.P. No. 25501/2015, Order, 
5-6 ¶ 7 (Lahore High Court, Sept. 14, 2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.
091415_0.pdf. 
 183. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling, 
Oct. 29, 1987, translated in https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/german/case.php?id=568; see also id. (“If the complainant wishes to 
claim that the public authority can meet its protective obligation only by taking a 
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complainant in Chemical Weapons did not meet this burden, but 
perhaps a climate complainant could, armed with substantial scientific 
research and publications. Indeed, the Urgenda court concluded that 
the Dutch government’s protective measures were inadequate.184 
Similarly, the German government’s own assessment establishes that 
Germany’s efforts are inadequate to reduce the country’s GHG 
emissions to the level the government deemed necessary,185 suggesting 
the possible success of a climate related constitutional complaint. 
Justice Mahrenholz’s dissent in Chemical Weapons provides even 
more fodder for a rights-based climate case.186 The dissent cited a case 
involving nuclear power plants which indicated “the fundamental right 
under Article 2(2) Basic Law is infringed not only by actual 
encroachment on the objects of legal protection therein. . . . Instead, 
such actual contravention is to be forestalled, so that the fundamental 
right can enter where precautionary measures against later operating 
risks are neglected. . . .”187 Article 2’s protection of unborn human life 
also touches on this concept.188 Thus, a climate litigant need not wait 
until dangerous climate change arrives and is undeniable; a 
complainant may seek to prevent the foreseeable harm before it 
happens. 
                                                                 
very specific measure, he must also conclusively show this and the nature of the 
measure to be taken.”). 
 184. Urgenda at ¶ 4.84-4.89 
 185. See FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, German Climate Policy, https://www.cop23.de/en/
bmub/german-climate-policy/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018); Michael Bauchmüller, 
Deutschland hinkt seinem Klimaziel hinterher, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Oct. 11, 
2017) http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/klimawandel-deutschland-hinkt-
seinem-klimaziel-hinterher-1.3702329 [http://perma.cc/6VML-ZHX7] (citing a 
leaked internal ministry paper that predicts Germany’s emissions will be 31.7 to 32.5 
percent below 1990 levels). 
 186. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling, 
Oct. 29, 1987 (J. Mahrenholz, dissenting); see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 
109, at 399 (referring to the dissent as “eloquent”). 
 187. In re Chemical Weapons Storage, BVerfGE 77, 170 2 BvR 624/83, Ruling, 
Oct. 29, 1987, Dissent at ¶ II.2.a (citing BVerfGE 53, 30 [57]). 
 188. See Abortion Cases, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) and 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993) (also 
relying on Article 1 human dignity). 
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2. Equal Protection 
Article 3(1) G.G. further guarantees that “[a]ll persons shall be equal 
before the law.”189 On equal protection claims, the court applies an 
arbitrariness or “rationality” test to unequal treatment,190 and 
heightened or “special”191 scrutiny for acts or omissions affecting other 
constitutionally protected interests.192 One Constitutional Court 
Justice has argued that G.G. Article 20’s “social state principle” 
demands heightened scrutiny of unequal treatment related to social 
welfare.193 The environmental state goal in Basic Law Article 20a is 
viewed similarly to the principle at Article 20, suggesting at least one 
Justice would open the door to heightened scrutiny of the state’s failure 
to protect future generations from existential threats to the 
environment, even though it is not an enumerated fundamental right.194 
The jurisprudence on the tests for heightened scrutiny is somewhat 
inconsistent,195 but Professor Somek summarizes a recent test as 
follows: 
                                                                 
 189. G.G. art. 3(1).  
 190. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 421 (citing 1 BVerfGE 14, 52 
(1951)). 
 191. See e.g. In re Life Imprisonment, 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977) (Reprinted in part 
in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 364) (applying “special scrutiny under 
the principle of proportionality”). See generally Currie, supra note 165. 
 192. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 421 and 422 (quoting 88 
BVerfGE 87 (1993)); Currie, supra note 165; Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of 
Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of American Equal 
Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, 314 (1998) (“Some commentators, 
therefore, have posited the evolution of a two-tiered scheme of general equal 
protection review which incorporates the proportionality principle on its higher level, 
triggered by treatments that are suspect because they affect single groups or burden 
other constitutional rights.”). 
 193. Currie, supra note 165, at 369 (citing 36 BVerfGE 237, 248-50 (Rupp-von 
Brünneck, J., dissenting)). 
 194. See e.g. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, PLENARPROTOKOLL 11/8, 379 (Apr. 2, 
1987) (Ger.), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11008.pdf#P.387 (statement of 
Dr. Hauff) (“We want environmental protection to be included in our constitution . . . 
as a state goal. Environmental protection, like the welfare state, must be a 
commitment to all state action.”). 
 195. See generally, Somek, supra note 192. 
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where groups are treated unequally and in instances where 
one can expect a negative impact on the exercise of other 
basic rights, a more searching inquiry is necessary into 
whether reasons of such a kind and weight that could justify 
the imposition of unequal legal consequences exist.196 
Another scholar described the court’s analysis as a “search for a 
reason ‘sufficient to justify’ the challenged distinction.”197 In many 
ways the protections of Article 3(1) are similar to those of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.198 The German Constitutional Court has cited U.S. Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence with approval, suggesting it could be 
persuasive authority, although of no precedential value.199 Therefore, 
a German litigant’s claims are likely to reflect some of the Equal 
Protection Clause arguments proffered by the plaintiffs in Juliana v. 
United States, which frames the inequity as between distinct groups of 
present and future generations.200 The plaintiffs in Juliana argue, inter 
alia, that the United States’ fossil fuel production and consumption 
cause irreversible climate change, consequently denying the youth 
plaintiffs “the same protection of fundamental rights afforded to prior 
and present generations of adult citizens.”201 The “acts of Defendants 
unconstitutionally favor the present, temporary economic benefits of 
certain citizens, especially corporations, over Plaintiffs’ rights to life, 
                                                                 
 196. See id. at 317 & 320. Professor Somek described one formula as follows: “the 
German Court first held that this Clause is violated . . . if a group of norm-addressees 
is treated differently from another group, although the differences between those 
groups are not of such a kind or such a weight as to justify the unequal treatment.” 
Id. at 308 (citing BVerfGE 55, 72 (88)). 
 197. Currie, supra note 165, at 369. 
 198. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIX, (“[No State shall] deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Currie, supra note 165, at 
368. 
 199. See, e.g., Somek, supra note 192, at 287. Professor Somek noted “[i]n the 
1980s, the German Court began borrowing from the United States Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence. . . .” and concluded, inter alia, “the German Court 
has attempted to apply borrowed constitutional provisions in such a matter that 
routinely falls short of meeting the German Court’s idealized approach to equal 
protection review.” Id. at 288 (discussing various standards of equal protection). 
 200. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1,224. 
 201. Complaint, Juliana v. United States, D. Or. Case No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, Dkt. 
7 ¶ 292 (filed Sept. 10, 2015). 
522 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
liberty, and property.”202 As of this writing, the level of scrutiny 
applied and whether those claims are successful in the District of 
Oregon remain to be seen.203 A recent ruling from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has increased the odds that the court will reach the 
merits in Juliana, reaffirming it as an important case for prospective 
German complainants to watch.204 
In Germany, a litigant could argue that the state’s failure to protect 
requires heightened scrutiny because of (1) the weight of the rights 
being infringed, (2) the weight of the public interest at issue, and (3) 
the significance of the differences between the affected groups.205 
First, the generational inequity from climate change infringes the 
state’s constitutional “responsibility toward future generations” to 
“protect the natural foundations of life,”206 as well as other 
fundamental rights.207 Second, the existential threat from climate 
change and its foreseeable harms are profound matters of public 
interest with the potential to impact everyone. Finally, the complainant 
could assert that the reference to “future generations” in the 
Grundgesetz highlights the significance of the difference between 
generational groups, tilting the balance to heightened scrutiny of the 
state’s acts and omissions that disproportionately affects youth and 
future Germans.208 Under heightened scrutiny, the state must justify 
the generational inequity of its failure to protect.209 It is difficult to 
predict whether the Court could find sufficient justification for state 
action and inaction that disproportionately harms future generations on 
such a scale as climate change. 
                                                                 
 202. Id. at ¶ 301. 
 203. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1,249, n.7. 
 204. United States v. United States Dist. Court, No. 17-71692, D.C. No. 6:15-cv-
01517-TC-AA, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5770 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying federal 
government’s petition for writ of mandamus). 
 205. See Somek, supra note 192, at 321 (indicating a German court could put the 
emphasis on the “significance of the differences between groups,” or on “the relative 
weight of the public interest or the infringement of the right.”). 
 206. G.G. art. 20a. 
 207. See infra, Section II.B. 
 208. G.G. art. 20a. 
 209. G.G. art. 3(1). 
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3. Property Rights 
The fundamental right to property is another potential basis for 
suit.210 Although subject to limitations, under the Basic Law the state 
is “obliged affirmatively to preserve and foster” this right.211 In their 
extensive reference on German constitutional jurisprudence, 
Professors Donald Kommers and Russell Miller explain: 
[t]o use the standard formulation, the right to property is an 
objective constitutional value that the state is obliged 
affirmatively to preserve and foster. Exactly and precisely 
what positive duty the state has under this theory has never 
been laid out in full. But some commentators have suggested 
that the objective character of Article 14 may require, for 
example, environmental protection legislation to preserve 
the value of property, the productive use of which depends 
on clean water and unspoiled forests.212 
With foreseeable sea level rise, extreme weather patterns and others, 
the impact of climate change on property is manifest.213 Indeed, Lliuya 
v. RWE, a civil case against the energy company RWE for climate-
change induced property damage, is moving forward in a German 
court.214 That court indicated “even a party who acts lawfully must be 
liable for property damage caused by him.”215 And in the seminal case 
                                                                 
 210. G.G. art. 14. 
 211. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 634. 
 212. Id. (citing P. Kunig, supra note 111, at 326-27, and Georg Ress, The Right to 
Property under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 10 (paper 
delivered at Notre Dame German-American Constitutional Law Conference, Apr. 
1986)). 
 213. See e.g. Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Insurance Risk-
Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 26 STAN. ENVTL. 
L. J. 251, 276-282 (2007) (“Climate change has the potential to affect virtually all 
segments of the property-casualty insurance business, including those covering 
damages to property, crops, and livestock; business interruptions; supply chain 
disruptions, or loss of utility service; equipment breakdown arising from extreme 
temperature events; and data loss from power surges or outages.”). 
 214. Order, Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court of Hamm 
(Nov. 30, 2017), unofficially translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/download/
20812.pdf. 
 215. Id. at ¶ 2. 
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Massachusetts v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court focused on 
climate-change induced impacts to coastal state property as a concrete 
harm for standing purposes.216 
A constitutional claim against the state under Article 14 would be 
more difficult than a civil claim, but has the potential to bolster a 
German complaint. It is generally understood that the property 
guarantee of Article 14(1) only permits the state to infringe individual 
property rights “in accordance with legal requirements, and for public 
purposes that are more important than the individual property 
guarantee.”217 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, “[t]he function of Article 
14 is not primarily to prevent the taking of property without 
compensation . . . but rather to secure existing property in the hands of 
its owners.”218 Although an exception allows expropriation of property 
“for the public good,” it is only “pursuant to a law that determines the 
nature and extent of compensation.” The German Federal Government 
certainly has not enacted such compensation vis-a-vis climate-change 
induced property loss and to be constitutional, the court would need to 
find that climate-change-induced property loss is a “public good” 
justifying the expropriation, an unlikely conclusion.219 
Indeed, the German basic right to property “protects the individual 
against every unjustified infringement of the entire range of protected 
interests.”220 Considering the affirmative protective obligation for 
fundamental rights, there is an argument to be made that the state’s 
                                                                 
 216. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 522-23 (2007). 
 217. Rebecca Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A 
Comparison of German and U.S. Law, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. LAW 389, 407-08 
(2007). 
 218. Id. at 416 (quoting Deichordnung case, BVerfG 1968, 24 BVerfGE 367 (389) 
(F.R.G.), translated in NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDREAS SAJO & 
SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1162 
(2003), also quoted in translation in KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 633)); 
see KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 631 (“For the most part, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has resolved the tension at work in Article 14 to the advantage 
of the individual liberty interest secured in the article’s first paragraph.” (citing 
Hamburg Flood Case, 24 BVerfGE 367 (1968))). 
 219. G.G. art. 14(3); see KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 631 (“In short, 
Parliament’s authority to define the content and limits of the right to property 
pursuant to Article 14(1)[2] cannot be interpreted to permit legislation that interferes 
with the essence of the right.”). 
 220. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 633 (quoting Hamburg Flood Case, 
24 BVerfGE 367 ¶ E.III.1.b (1968)). 
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failure to protect property from foreseeable climate change destruction 
is a cognizable constitutional claim.221 However, Article 14 
jurisprudence generally involves specific regulations or targeted 
expropriations that cause property damage or loss. For this reason, a 
climate change complaint could also attempt to show that specific 
governmental action, such as permitting lignite mines or coal-fired 
power plants, causes property loss due to climate change. Showing 
causation will be challenging, but Lliuya v. RWE suggests it is possible 
with the right expert opinions and evidence.222 
CONCLUSION 
With rights-based climate litigation gaining traction, there is no 
reason to think litigants in Germany will stay on the sidelines. The 
odds are that the Federal Constitutional Court will see a rights-based 
climate complaint in the near future. A German complaint is likely to 
piggyback on (1) the “duty of care to take [climate change] mitigation 
measures” in the Netherlands, (2) the recognized “right to an 
environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well being 
of citizens at large” in Ireland, and (3) the “right to a climate system 
capable of sustaining human life” in the United States, among others. 
The constitutional structure in Germany and the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court suggest the Court would recognize a similar right 
to an environment that maintains life for future generations. The 
environmental state goal of Grundgesetz Article 20a, bolstered by the 
German fundamental rights to life, equal protection, and property 
provide a framework on which to base an as of yet unenumerated 
constitutional right to a life-sustaining environment. On the global 
stage, it would not be an unprecedented step for the Constitutional 
Court to link such an environmental right to duties related to climate 
change mitigation. 
Whether a German litigant could succeed in holding the government 
liable for failing to protect against infringement of this right is another 
matter. Scientific consensus indicates that the worst foreseeable effects 
of anthropogenic climate change could infringe such a right by causing 
droughts and extreme heat waves, increasing the intensity of natural 
                                                                 
 221. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 109, at 634. 
 222. Order, Saúl Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG, Higher Regional Court of Hamm 
(Nov. 30, 2017), translated in https://germanwatch.org/en/download/20812.pdf. 
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disasters, and creating conditions for epidemics, to name a few.223 The 
scientific evidence for these probable effects opens the door to a legal 
claim. Yet, even if a court agrees that there is a constitutional right to 
a certain environmental quality that climate change threatens, the 
complainant would still need to show that Germany’s actions (or lack 
thereof) are so egregious that it violates that right. After all, climate 
change is a global problem in a complicated ecological system that 
Germany cannot solve on its own. Not all courts that have recognized 
an environmental right have found liability and ordered relief. 
Germany has already reduced its emissions by approximately 27.3% 
compared to its 1990 levels. 224 Therefore, Germany’s lack of more 
aggressive progress is not as egregious as that of the Netherlands, 
which the Court in Urgenda held was so flagrant that the Netherland’s 
had breached its duty of care to its citizens. Indeed, as of 2016, 
Germany had already achieved the reductions that the Urgenda court 
ordered the Netherlands to take by 2020.225 This all weighs heavily 
against the likelihood that the Constitutional Court would find liability 
for Germany and order relief. However, by the German government’s 
own measure, Germany is not doing enough to reduce its GHG 
emissions. The German government previously determined that 
reducing its 2020 emissions to 40% of its 1990 levels was necessary, 
which could be a standard the Court adopts. Now that it is clear that 
Germany’s current path will not achieve this reduction, a court could 
grant relief mandating more aggressive action. 
Although the likelihood of success on a rights-based climate claim 
seems slight, ten years ago it would have seemed fanciful. As the 
pathways for effective climate change mitigation diminish, locking the 
planet into a destructive trajectory, court involvement is becoming 
                                                                 
 223. See generally, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/
report/ar5/wg2/. 
 224. See Federal Environment Agency (Umwelt Bundesamt), Climate Gas 
Emissions Rose Again in 2016, (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/
presse/pressemitteilungen/klimagasemissionen-stiegen-im-jahr-2016-erneut-an 
[http://perma.cc/WB3C-QAAM]. 
 225. See Urgenda Found. v. Neth., HA ZA 13-1396 The Hague Dist. Ct. ¶ 5.1 
(Chamber for Comm. Affairs June 24, 2015) (under appeal), http://www.urgenda.nl/
documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf (ordering a 25% 
reduction below 1990 levels). 
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increasingly accepted. Someday soon, the German Constitutional 
Court may have its chance to join the fray. 
